What law firms consider their strengths may prove to be their weaknesses in today’s rapidly changing business environment. Firms that fail to aggressively innovate to meet growing competition may be missing a key opportunity to save themselves.
Well before Blockbuster Video actually filed for bankruptcy protection last fall, The Onion produced a prescient video about a museum tour based on the movie rental chain: Historic ‘Blockbuster’ Store Offers Glimpse Of How Movies Were Rented In The Past.1 One dazzled visitor remarks: “It’s like stepping into a time machine … it’s hard to believe people used to live this way.” The whole feature is well-worth the two minutes, but the sting comes at the end, as the anchor adds: “Blockbuster joins a growing number of historical sites, including Buffalo, New York’s recreation of a Virgin Records music store and Iowa City’s Borders Bookstore Museum.”
The only thing more striking than the dismantling of these former powerhouse franchises is the speed at which they’re coming apart. Blockbuster, Virgin and Borders were corporate giants with global reach and massive brand strength. Yet today, when you think of videos, music and books, you first think of Netflix, iTunes and Amazon, companies that launched in 2001, 1999 and 1995, respectively. How did the mighty fall so swiftly?
James Surowiecki asks that very question in a recent New Yorker column,2 citing not just Blockbuster but other former “category killers” like Home Depot, Toys R Us, and Circuit City, companies that dominated the “big-box” developments that spread like wildfire throughout suburbia over the last few decades.
These stores were also giants in their day, but today each is either struggling badly in the new economy or has already sunk beneath the waves. Surowiecki puts his finger on the problem in three paragraphs that every law firm leader should read and take to heart:
The problem—in Blockbuster’s case, at least—was that the very features that people thought were strengths turned out to be weaknesses. Blockbuster’s huge investment, both literally and psychologically, in traditional stores made it slow to recognize the web’s importance: in 2002, it was still calling the Net a “niche” market. And it wasn’t just the Net. Blockbuster was late on everything—online rentals, Redbox-style kiosks, streaming video.
There was a time when customers had few alternatives, so they tolerated the chain’s limited stock, exorbitant late fees … and absence of good advice about what to watch. But, once Netflix came along, it became clear that you could have tremendous variety, keep movies as long as you liked, and, thanks to the Netflix recommendation engine, actually get some serviceable advice. (Places like Netflix and Amazon have demonstrated the great irony that computer algorithms can provide a more personalized and engaging customer experience than many physical stores.)
Why didn’t Blockbuster evolve more quickly? In part, it was because of what you could call the “internal constituency” problem: the company was full of people who had been there when bricks-and-mortar stores were hugely profitable, and who couldn’t believe that those days were gone for good. Blockbuster treated its thousands of stores as if they were a protective moat, when in fact they were the business equivalent of the Maginot Line.
What happened to Blockbuster and Virgin and Circuit City is now starting to happen to law firms, for all the same reasons. Firms have invested heavily in legacy costs like long-term leases of downtown offices with rich interiors, and have resolutely refused to take the internet seriously as a service delivery vehicle. They have thrived from the absence of client choice, but will suffer as new competitors offer more options and, ironically, more personalized service. Firms aren’t evolving because they can’t evolve: the lawyers within these firms are so invested financially and emotionally in the old structure that they can’t believe things could change.
It’s difficult to see how the outcome for our profession will be any different, because like Blockbuster, we aren’t even trying to adapt. Almost all the innovation in the legal marketplace is now taking place outside of law firms or on their periphery. Contract lawyers work from home, legal process outsourcers work from Mumbai or Manila, LegalZoom works entirely on the internet—these entities are the drivers of change today. The happy result for clients is a fractured marketplace in which they’ll have their choice of which providers to provide which services in which priority.
If you want to see what the client of the future looks like, in fact, take a good look at Colt Technology Services, a UK-based, Europe-wide IT company profiled recently in The Lawyer.3 Colt’s GC uses a combination of providers, including law firms, an offshore captive operation, contract lawyers, and Berwin Leighton Paisner’s revolutionary Lawyers On Demand service,4 to meet his company’s legal needs. This is an established client trend towards using a portfolio of legal providers, and law firms should be aware of it by now.
But what really concerns me is this: where is the strategic response from law firms to the revolution outside their gates? Where are the signs that firms recognize the existential threats to their marketplace position and are reacting accordingly?
Here’s an example: in October 2010, Bloomberg BusinessWeek published a cover story about Diapers.com, a sort of Amazon.com for baby and infant products that looked to be the next evolution in online shopping.5 Its founders were quoted in the article as saying they’d welcome a price war with Amazon, and the article was in fact titled “What Amazon Fears Most.” Shortly thereafter, Amazon announced it had bought out Diapers.com for a truly stunning $545 million.6 That is how you handle upstart competition that threatens your market position.
So what are law firms, facing the same kind of threat, doing these days? Merging with each other, of course: mergers within the United States, within Canada, and across the Atlantic with more surely to come. Same old response, same old thinking. Where are the law firms buying out legal process outsourcers (LPOs) and bringing them inhouse? Where are the law firms adapting the online delivery methods of startups? Where are the law firms that recognize the peril of their position and are moving to thwart, or to transform themselves into, their smaller, swifter, hungrier new rivals? They’re nowhere to be found, and that’s why the future of law firms looks a lot more like Blockbuster than Netflix.
Surowiecki concludes his article with an observation that readers of The Innovator’s Dilemma will find familiar: “Sometimes you have to destroy your business to save it.” Law firms, unfortunately for them, don’t come with self-destruct buttons.
1http://www.theonion.com/video/historic-blockbuster-store-offers-glimpse-of-how-m,14233/ 2 http://www.newyorker.com/talk/financial/2010/10/18/101018ta_talk_surowiecki 3 http://www.thelawyer.com/colt-resolver-robin-saphra-colt-technology-services/1006043.article 4 http://www.blplaw.com/index.cfm/Lawyers_on_Demand/1472 5 http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_42/b4199062749187.htm 6 http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-11-08/amazon-com-to-buy-diapers-com-owner-for-500-million.html"> http://www.theonion.com/video/historic-blockbuster-store-offers-glimpse-of-how-m,14233/
Jordan Furlong is a speaker, writer and consultant who helps law firms and legal organizations throughout North America understand the extraordinary changes in the legal marketplace. Read his blog Law21 (http://law21.ca) and contact him at firstname.lastname@example.org. His article first appeared on his blog on November 11, 2010, and is reprinted here by permission.